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CRIMINOLOGY
DETERRENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A RECONSIDERATION
HUGO ADAM BEDAU,
This empirical reconsideration of Professor Van den Haag's analysis of the deterrent effect of
the death penalty (published in the June, 1969 issue of this Journal) attacks the loose framework
of the analysis as a prototype of research in this area. It sharpens the questions and cuts away the
misleading conclusions surrounding the death penalty controversy and challenges criminologists
and the legislatures to determine empirically whether deterrence exists as a factor in the consideration.
Professor Van den Haag's recent article, On
(5) "Since it seems more important to spare
Deterrence and the Death Penalty,"raises a number victims than to spare murderers, the burden of
of points of that mixed (i.e., empirical-and-concepproving that the greater severity inherent in irretual-and-normative) character which typifies most vocability adds nothing to deterrence lies on those
actual reasoning in social and political controversy
who oppose capital punishment." I
but which (except when its purely formal aspects
The refutation of the foregoing assertions
are in question) tends to be ignored by philoso- will constitute the task of this article. The rephers. This discussion will pass by any number of buttal arguments may be succinctly summarized as
tempting points in his critique in order to focus in follows: regarding (1), utilitarian abolitionists
detail only on those which affect his asserted major do not argue as Van den Haag claims, and they
topic-the issue of deterrence as it bears on the re- would be in error if they did; his assertion in (2),
tention or abolition of the death penalty.
that situations exist in which the death penalty is
Van den Haag's main contentions appear to be the only possible deterrent, is misleading and, in
the interesting cases, is empirically insignificant;
the following:
(1) Abolitionists of a utilitarian persuasion concerning (3), the heart of the dispute, Van den
"claim that capital punishment is useless because Haag is correct in affirming that deterrence has not
been determined statistically, but he is incorrect
it does not deter others .... )2
(2) There are some classes of criminals and some in denying that non-deterrence has been demoncircumstances for which "the death penalty is the strated statistically; his suggestion, (4), that the
added severity of the death penalty contributes
only possible deterrent." 1
(3) As things currently stand, "deterrence [of to its deterrent function, is unempirical and onecriminal homicide by the death penalty] has not sided as well; finally, his contention regarding the
been demonstrated statistically;" but it is errone- burden of proof, (5), which he would impose enous to assume that "non-deterrence" has been tirely upon abolitionists, is a dodge and is based on
a muddled analysis.
demonstrated statistically. 4
The reason for pursuing in some detail what at
(4) The death penalty is to be favored over
first might appear to be mere polemical controimprisonment because "the added severity of the
versy is not that Professor Van den Haag's essay is
death penalty adds to deterrence, or may do so." 6
so persuasive nor that it is likely to be of unusual
* Professor of Philosophy, Tufts University.
influence. The reason is that the issues he raises,
'Van den Haag, On Deterrenceand the Death Penalty, even though they are familiar, have not been
60 J. Ctim. L. C. & P.S. 141 (1969). This is a "revised version" under the same title of an article which adequately discussed, despite a dozen state,
first appeared in 78 E.Tcs 280 (1968). The author congressional, and foreign government investigais grateful to Professor Van den Haag for the provision
tions into capital punishment in recent years. In
of a reprint of each version of the article.
260 J. CzRw. L. C. & P.S. 141 (1969).
Massachusetts, for example, several persons under
3Id. at 145.
sentence of death have been granted stays of execu4Id.
r,Id. at 146.
6 Id. at 147.
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tion pending the final report of a special legislative
commission to investigate the death penalty. The
exclusive mandate of this commission is to study
the question of deterrence.7 Its provisional conclusions, published late in 1968, though not in line
with Professor Van den Haag's views, are open to
the kind of criticism he makes. This suggests that
his reasoning may be representative of many who
have tried to understand the arguments and research studies brought forward by those who would
abolish the death penalty, and therefore that his
errors are worth exposure and correction.

effect which actual or theoretical punishment of
offenders has upon potential offenders." n On such
a definition, one could not distinguish between the
deterrent effect of the death penalty and its more
inclusive preventive effects. Obviously, an executed
criminal is prevented from further crimes, but not
by having been deterred from them.P
Only rarely will the preventive and the deterrent
effects of a given punishment be equivalent. Van
den Haag's definition, however, falls before a similar objection upon consideration of the general,
though by no means universal, desire of persons to
avoid capture and punishment for the crimes they
I
commit. Some criminologists have thought this
desire to be the primary outcome of severe punishThe claim Van den Haag professes to find "most
persuasive"- "capital punishment is useless be- ments. If so, then the outcome can result whether
cause it does not deter others"-is strange, and it or not the deterrent function succeeds. Yet such a
is strange that he finds it so persuasive. Anyone desire to avoid punishment is embraced by Van den
who would make this claim must assume that only Haag's rubric of "general response" and therefore
deterrent efficacy is relevant to assessing the utility could count as evidence for the deterrent efficacy of
of a punishment. In a footnote, Van den Haag a punishment! Since Van den Haag's conception of
implicitly concedes that deterrence may not be the deterrence does not discriminate between such
only utilitarian consideration, when he asserts that fundamentally different types of "general rewhatever our penal "theory" may tell us, "deter- sponse" to the threat of punishment, it is too illrence is ...the main actual function of legal pun- formulated as a definition to be of any serious use.
ishment if we disregard nonutilitarian ones." 8 But
Among the ideas to be incorporated into any
he does not pursue this qualification. It may be definition of deterrence are a pair of truisms: if
conceded that if 'the main actual function' means someone has been deterred then he doesn't comthe main intended or professed function of a pun- mit the crime, and conversely if someone does
ishment for those responsible for instituting it, commit a crime then he hasn't been deterred.
deterrence is probably the main function of punish- Likewise, the key notion in deterrence is prevenment. His definition of deterrence, however, re- tion by threat of punishment. Therefore, assume
mains vulnerable. According to Van den Haag, it
(Definition 1) that a given punishment (P) is a
is "a preconscious, general response to a severe but deterrent for a given person (A) with respect to a
not necessarily specifically and explicitly appre- given crime (C) at a given time () if and only if
A does not commit C at t because lie believes he
hended or calculated threat." 9
This definition of deterrence has two merits and runs some risk of P if he commits C and A preat least one fatal defect. First, it preserves the idea fers, ceteris paribus,not to suffer P for committing
that "a law can have no deterrent effect upon a C. This definition does not presuppose that P
potential criminal if he is unaware of its exist- really is the punishment for C (a person could be
ence." 1 0 Surely, this is a truism necessary to the deterred through a mistaken belief); it does not
presuppose that A runs a high risk of incurring P
establishment of a definition of 'deterrence'.
Second, by emphasizing threats, it avoids the (the degree of risk could be zero); or that A conerrors in defining deterrence as "the preventative sciously thinks of P prior to t (the theory needed
to account for the operation of A's beliefs and
7See ch. 150, Mass. Acts & Resolves 929 (1969);
MASS. LEGISLATIVE REPOR.T, INTERhxK REPORT OF THE
SPEcIAL Comi sSIoN EsTABLISiED To MAKE AN
INVESTIGATION AND ST n RELATIVE TO TnE EFFEcTIVENESS OF CAPITAL PUNI5SMIET AS A DETERENT
TO Cann (1968) (unpublished).

8Van den Haag, supra note 1, at 147 n. 11 (emphasis added).
910Id. at 146.
Ball, The Deterrence Concept in Criminology and
Law, 46 J. CPu. L., C. & P.S. 347, 351 (1955).

n Id.at 347.
"Ball writes that "Capital punishment can be
totally effective as a deterrent ... The executed
murderer is no longer a threat to society. He has been
permanently deterred." Id. at 353. This is an erroneous
conclusion to reach, and when Ball goes on to use it to
argue in favor of the deterrent efficacy of the death
penalty, it reveals the menace which lies hidden in a
faulty definition.
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preferences on his conduct is left open). Nor does
it presuppose that anyone ever suffers P (P could
be a "perfect" deterrent), nor that only P could
have deterred A from C (some sanction less severe
than P might have worked as well). Finally, it
does not presuppose that because P deters A at
t from C, therefore P would deter A at any other
time or anyone else at t. The definition insures
that we cannot argue erroneously from the fact
that A does not commit C to the conclusion that
P has succeeded as a deterrent: the definition
contains conditions which prevent this. Further,
the definition prevents the commission of the more
subtle converse error of arguing from the fact that
A has not been deterred by P to the conclusion
that A will (or must have) commit(ted) C. Both
these errors arise from supposing that "the educative, moralizing and habituative effects of punishment", 3 which serve to prevent the bulk of the
public from committing crime, are euphemisms for
'deterrence' or operate by the same mechanisms
that deterrence does.
Definition 1 suggests a general functional analogue appropriate to express scientific measurements of differential deterrent eficacy of a given
punishment for a given crime with respect to a
given population (Definition 2). Let us say that a
given punishment P deters a given population H
from a crime C to the degree D that the members
of H do not commit C because they believe that
they run some risk of P if they commit C and,
ceteris paribus, they prefer not to suffer P for
committing C. If D = 0, then P has completely
failed as a deterrent, whereas if D = 1, P has
proved to be a perfect deterrent. Given this definition and the appropriate empirical results for
various values of P, C, and H, it should be possible
to establish on inductive grounds the relative
effectiveness of a given punishment (the value of
D) as a deterrent.
Definition 2 in turn suggests the following
corollary for assertions of relative superior deterrent efficacy of one punishment over another: a
given punishment PI is a superior deterrent to
another punishment P2 with respect to some crime
C and some population H if and only if: if the
members of H believe that they are liable to P 1
upon committing C, then they commit C to the
degree di; whereas if the members of H believe
that they are liable to P2 upon committing C, then

they commit C to the degree d2 ; and di < d2 . This
formulation plainly allows the.P 1 may be a more
effective deterrent than P2 for C1 and yet less
effective as a deterrent than P2 for a different crime
C2 (with H constant), and so forth for other possibilities. When speaking about deterrence in the
sections which follow, these definitions and this
corollary are presupposed.
Even if Van den Haag's notion of deterrence did
not need to be reformulated to incorporate the
above improvements, there would still be a
decisive objection to his claim. Neither classic nor
contemporary utilitarians have argued for or
against the death penalty solely on the ground of
deterrence, nor would their ethical theory entitle
them to do so. One measure of the non-deterrent
utility of the death penalty derives from its
elimination (through death of a known criminal)
of future possible crimes from that source; another
arises from the elimination of the criminal's probable adverse influence upon others to emulate his
ways; another lies in the generally lower budgetary
outlays of tax monies needed to finance a system
of capital punishment as opposed to long-term
imprisonment. There are still further consequences
apart from deterrence which the scrupulous
utilitarian must weigh, along with the three
previously mentioned. Therefore, it is incorrect to
assume that a demonstrated failure of the deterrent effect of the death penalty would generate an
inference, on utilitarian assumptions, that "the
death penalty is useless" and therefore ought to
be abolished. The problem for the utilitarian is to
make commensurable such diverse social utilities
as those measured by deterrent efficacy, administrative costs, etc., and then to determine which penal
policy in fact maximizes utility. Finally, inspection
of sample arguments actually used by abolitionists 4
will show that Van den Haag has attacked a straw
man: there are few if any contemporary abolitionists (and Van, den Haag names none) who argue
solely from professedly utilitarian assumptions,
and there is none among the non-utilitarians who
would abolish the death penalty solely on grounds
of its deterrent inefficacy.

13Zimring and Hawkins, Deterrence and Marginal
Groups, 5 JoumlA. or RE EARcn iN CR
ANm

14 See the several essays reprinted in H. BEDAu,
THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERIcA 166-70 (Rev. ed.
1967).

D L QUENcy 100 (1968).

II
Governments faced by incipient rebellion or
threatened by a coup d'etat may well conclude, as
Van den Haag insists they should, that rebels (as
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well as traitors and spies) can be deterred, if at
all, by the threat of death, since "swift victory" of
the revolution "will invalidate [the deterrent
efficacy] of a prison sentence." 15 But this does not
reveal the importance of providing such deterrence,
any more than the fact that a threat of expulsion
is the severest deterrent available to university
authorities reveals whether they should insist on
expelling campus rebels. Also, since severe penalties might have the effect of creating martyrs for
the cause, they could provoke attempts to overthrow the government to secure a kind of political
sainthood. This possibility Van den Haag recognizes but claims in a footnote that it "hardly
impairs the force of the argument." 16 From a
logical point of view it impairs the argument
considerably; from an empirical point of view,
since one is wholly without any reliable facts or
hypotheses on politics in such extreme situations,
the entire controversy remains quite speculative.
The one important class of criminals deterrable,
if at all, by the death penalty consists, according
to Van den Haag, of those already under "life"
sentence or guilty of a crime punishable by "life".
In a trivial sense, he is correct; a person already
suffering a given punishment, P, for a given crime,
C1, could not be expected to be deterred by anticipating the re-infliction of P were he to commit
C2. For if the dread of P did not deter him from
committing C1, how could the dread of P deter
him from committing C2 given that he is already
experiencing P? This generalization seems to
applywheneverP = "life" imprisonment. Actually,
the truth is a bit more complex, because in practice
(as Van den Haag concedes, again in a footnote)
so-called "life" imprisonment always has its aggravations (e.g., solitary confinement) and its
mitigations (parole eligibility). These make it
logically possible to deter a person already convicted of criminal homicide and serving "life"
imprisonment from comnmitting another such
crime. The aggravations available are not, in
practice, likely to provide much added deterrent
effect; but exactly how likely or unlikely this
effect is remains a matter for empirical investigation, not idle guesswork. Van den Haag's seeming
truism, therefore, relies for its plausibility on the
false assumption that "life" imprisonment is a
15Van den Haag, supra note 1, at 145. The same
argument has been advanced earlier in Hook, 7 Tnx
NEw YoRK LAw FoRum 278-83 (1961). For the
revised version of this argument, see H. BEDAu, supra
note 14, at 150-51.
16 Van den Haag, supra note 1, at 145 n. 8.
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uniform punishment not open to further deterrence-relevant aggravations and mitigations.
Empirically, the objection to his point is that
persons already serving a "life" sentence do not in
general constitute a source of genuine alarm to
custodial personnel. Being already incarcerated and
integrated into the reward structure of prison
life, they do not seem to need the deterrent controls
allegedly necessary for other prisoners and the
general publicP There are convicts who are exceptions to this generalization, but there is no known
way of identifying them in advance, and their
number has proved to be small. It would be irrational, therefore, to design a penal policy which
invokes the death penalty for the apparent purpose
of deterring such convicted offenders from further
criminal homicide.18 Van den Haag cites no evidence that such policies accomplish their alleged
purpose, and a review of authorities reveals none.
The real question which Van den Haag's argument
raises is: Is there any class of actual or potential
criminals for which the death penalty exerts a
marginally superior deterrent effect over every
less severe alternative? With reference to this
question there is no evidence at all, one way or
the other. Until a determination is made as to
whether there is a "marginal group" for whom the
death penalty serves as a superior deterrent, there
is no reason to indulge Van den Haag in his speculations 9
III
It is not clear why Van den Haag is so anxious
to discuss whether there is evidence that the
death penalty is a deterrent, or whether, as he
thinks, there is no evidence that it is not a deterrent. For the issue over abolishing the death
penalty, as all serious students of the subject have
known for decades, is not whether (1) the death
penalty is a deterrent, but whether (2) the death
penalty is a superior deterrent to "life" imprisonment, and consequently the evidential dispute is
also not over (1) but only over (2). As this author
17 See, e.g., Sellin, Prison Homicides, in CATAL.
154-160 (T. Sellin ed. 1967).
PuNIsmExNT
1
Rhode Island (1852), North Dakota (1915), New
York (1965), Vermont (1965), and New Mexico (1969),
have all qualified their abolition of the death penalty
by enacting such a policy. See H. BEDAu, supra note
14, at 12.
29Zinring and Hawkins, supra note 13, at 104-05,
explain that by a marginal group they mean "the
entire class of persons who are objectively on the margin
of a particular form of criminal behavior, or, in other
words, the class of persons 'next most likely' to engage
in criminal behavior in question."
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has argued elsewhere, 0 abolitionists have reason
to contest (1) only if they are against all punitive
alternatives to the death penalty. Since few
abolitionists (and none cited by Van den Haag)
take this extreme view, and since most are, in
fact, reconciled to a punitive alternative of "life"
imprisonment, we may concentrate on (2) here. It
should be noticed in passing, however, that if (1)
could be demonstrated to be false, there would be
no need for abolitionists to marshall evidence
against (2). Since the truth of (1) is a presupposition of (2), the falsity of (1) would obviate (2)
entirely. While it is true that some abolitionists
may be faulted for writing as if the falsity of (1)
followed from the falsity of (2), this is not a
complaint Van den Haag makes nor is it an error
of inference upon which the argument against the
death penalty depends. Similar considerations
inveigh against certain pro-death penalty arguments. Proponents must do more than establish
(1), they must also provide evidence in favor of
(2); and they cannot infer from evidence which
establishes (1) that (2) is true or even probable
(unless, of course, that evidence would establish
(2) independently). These considerations show us
how important it is to distinguish (1) and (2) and
the questions of evidence which each raises. Van
den Haag never directly discusses (2); he only
observes in passing that "the question is not only
whether the death penalty deters but whether it
deters more than alternatives ....
"21 Since he
explicitly argues over the evidential status of (1),
it is unclear whether he chose to ignore (2) or
whether he thinks that his arguments regarding
the evidence for (1) also have consequences for
(2). Perhaps Van den Haag thinks that if there is
no evidence disconfirming (1), then there can be
no evidence disconfirming (2); or perhaps he thinks
that none of the evidence disconfrming (2) also
disconfirms (1). (If he thinks either, he is wrong.)
Or perhaps he is careless, conceding on the one
hand that (2) is important to the issue of abolition
of the death penalty, only to slide back into a
discussion exclusively about (1).
Van den Haag writes as if his chief contentions
were these two: first, we must not confuse (a) the
assertion that there is no evidence that (1), with
(b) the assertion that there is evidence that not(1), i.e., evidence that (1) is false; and second,
abolitionists have asserted (b) whereas all they are
20
H. BEDAu, supra note 14, at 260-61.
Van den Haag, supra note 1, at 145.

entitled to assert is (a).2 I grant, as anyone must,
that the distinction between (a) and (b) is legitimate and important. But since, as I have argued,
(1) need not be at issue in the death penalty
controversy, neither are (a) and (b). What is at
issue, even though Van den Haag's discussion
obscures the point, is whether abolitionists must
content themselves with asserting that there is no
evidence against (2), or whether they may go
further and assert that there is evidence that not(2) (evidence that (2) is false). Whereas Van den
Haag would presumably confine abolitionists to
the former, weaker assertion, it shall be argued
that they may make the stronger, latter, assertion.
In order to see the issue fairly it is necessary to
see how (2) has so far been submitted to empirical
test. First of all, the issue has been confined to the
death penalty for criminal homicide; consequently,
it is not (2) but a subsidiary proposition which
critics of the death penalty have tested- (2a) the
death penalty is a superior deterrent to "life" imprisonmentfor the crime of criminal homicide. The
falsification of (2a) does not entail the falsity of
(2); the death penalty could still be a superior
deterrent to "life" imprisonment for the crime of
2 Van den Haag accuses Professor Thorasten Sellin,
a criminologist "who has made a careful study of the
available statistics," of appearing to "think that this
lack of evidence for deterrence is evidence for the lack
of deterrence." Id. That is, Van den Haag claims Sellin
thinks that (a) is (b) ! Sellin's writings, see, e.g., note
17 supra, do not support the contention that he
"thinks" the one "is" the other. A review of his writings, which span the years from 1953-1967, will reveal
a certain vacillation between the two manners of
stating his conclusion. His most recent statement is
unqualified in the (b) form. See Sellin, supra note 17,
at 138. Since Van den Haag also cited this author's,
THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERCA, supra note 14,

though not in this connection, it should be added that
the distinction between (a) and (b) was there made;
but it was not insisted, as it is here, that the argument
entitles'abolitionists to assert (b). See id. at 264-65.
For the views of writers, all criminologists, who have
recently stated the same or a stronger conclusion, see,
e.g., Chambliss, Types of Deviance and the Effectiveness
of Legal Sanctions, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 703, 706 (1967)
("Capital punishment does not act as an effective
deterrent to murder"); Morris & Zimring, Deterrence
and Correction, 381 THE ANars 137, 143 (1969)
("The capital punishment controversy has produced
the most reliable information on the general deterrent
effect of a criminal sanction. It now seems established
and accepted that... the death penalty makes no
difference to the homicide rate..."); Reckless, The
Use of the Death Penalty, 15 Carm & DELIrNQ. 43, 52
(1969) ("ITihe evidence indicates that [the death
penalty for murder] has no discernible effects in the
United States .... "); Doleschal, The Deterrent Effect of
Legal Punishment, 1 ThromAOrio REv. oN Cpa,
AND DELiNQ. 1, 7 (1969) ("Capital punishment is
ineffective in deterring murder").
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burglary, etc. However, the disconfirmation of
(2a) would be obviously a significant partial disconfirmation of (2). Secondly, (2a) has not been
tested directly but only indirectly. No one has
devised a way to count or estimate directly the
number of persons in a given population who have
been deterred from criminal homicide by the fear
of the penalty. The difficulties in doing so are
plain enough. For instance, it would be possible
to infer from the countable numbers who have not
been deterred (because they did commit a given
crime) that everyone else in the population was
deterred, but only on the assumption that the
only reason why a person did not commit a given
crime is because he was deterred. Unfortunately for
this argument (though happily enough otherwise)
this assumption is almost certainly false, as we
have noted above in section I. Other methods
which might be devised to test (2a) directly have
proved equally unfeasible. Yet it would be absurd
to insist that there can be no evidence for or against
(2a) unless it is direct evidence for or against it.
Because Van den Haag nowhere indicated what he
thinks would count as evidence, direct or indirect,
for or against (1), much less (2), his insistence
upon the distinction between (a) and (b) and his
rebuke to abolitionists is in danger of implicitly
relying upon just this absurdity.
How, then, has the indirect argument for (2a)
proceeded? During the past generation, at least six
different hypotheses have been formulated, as
corollaries of (2a), as follows :2

[Vol. 61

lower annual rate of criminal homicide than
abolition jurisdictions;
(ii) jurisdictions which abolished the death
penalty should show an increased annual
rate of criminal homicide after abolition;
(iii) jurisdictions which reintroduced the death
penalty should show a decreased annual rate
of criminal homicide after reintroduction;
(iv) given two contiguous jurisdictions differing
chiefly in that one has the death penalty and
the other does not, the latter should show a
higher annual rate of criminal homicide;
(v) police officers on duty should suffer a higher
annual rate of criminal assault and homicide
in abolition jurisdictions than in death penalty
jurisdictions;
(vi) prisoners and prison personnel should suffer
a higher annual rate of criminal assault and
homicide from life-term prisoners in abolition
jurisdictions than in death penalty jurisdictions.

It could be objected to these six hypotheses that
they are, as a set, insufficient to settle the question
posed by (2a) no matter what the evidence for
them may be-that the falsity of (i)-(vi) does not
entail the falsity of (2a). Or it could be objected
that each of (i)-(vi) has been too inadequately
tested or insufficiently disconfirmed to establish
any disconfirmation of (2a), even though it is
conceded that if (i)-(i) were highly disconfirmed
they would disconfirm (2a). Van den Haag's line
of attack is not entirely clear as between these two
alternatives. It appears that he should take the
former line of criticism in its most extreme version.
How else could he argue his chief point, that the
(i) death penalty jurisdictions should have a
research used by abolitionists has so far failed to
2 The relevant research, regarding each of the six
produce any evidence against (1)-we may take
hypotheses in the text, is as follows:
(i) Schuessler, The Deterrent Influence of the Death him to mean (2) or (2a)? Only if (i)-(vi) were
Penalty, 284 THE ANNALS 54, 57 (1952); Reckless, irrelevant to (2a) could it be fairly concluded from
The Use of the Death Penalty-A Factual Statement,
the evidential disconfirmation of (i)-(vi) that
15 CRn AN DELINQ. 43,52 (1969) (Table No. 9).
(ii) Thorsten Sellin, The Death Penalty, reprinted there is still no disconfirmation of (2a). And this is
in H. BEDAu, supra note 14, at 274-84; updated in
Van den Haag's central contention. The other
Sellin, supranote 17, at 135-38.
(iii) Sellin, supra note 17, at 34-38; reprinted in ways to construe Van den Haag's reasoning are
H. BEDAU, supra note 14, at 339-43.
too implausible to be considered: he cannot think
(iv) See works cited in (i).
(v) CANADA, MruWms Am PROCEEMINGS OF Evi- that the evidence is indIfferent to or confirms
DENCE, JOINT COMM=rTEE oF Tm
SENATE AND
(i)-(vi); nor can he think that there has been no
HousE oF CommoNs OF CAPITAL PuNmmINT AND
attempt at all to disconfirm (2a); nor can he think
COmOREAL PUNISHNT AND LoTTERIEs and THE
that the evidence which disconfirms (i)-(vi) is not
STATE PoLicE AND =HDEATH PENA.TY, app. F, pt.
I, at 718-35 (1955); The Death Penalty and Polce therewith also evidence which confirms the negaSafety, in H. BEDAU, supra note 14, at 284-301, and -tions of (i)-(vi). If any of
these three were true it
in CAPITAL PuNis;nirm, supranote 17, at 138-54.
would be a good reason for saying that there is
(Vi) MASSACHUSETTs, REPORT AND REcomENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL COiMtSSION [ON] mx DEATH
"no evidence" against (2a); but each is patently
PENALTY, 1958, in H. BEDAu, supra note 14, at 400;
Sellin, Prison Hornocides, in CeiTA PuNIsmENT, false. If one inspects (i)- (vi) and (2a), it is difficult
supra note 17, at 154-60.
to see how one could argue that disconfirmation of
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the former does not constitute disconfirmation of
the latter, even if it might be argued that verification of the former does not constitute verification
of the latter. Therefore, there is nothing to be
gained by further pursuit of this first line of
attack.
Elsewhere, Van den Haag seems to adopt the
alternative criticism, albeit rather crudely, as when
he argues (against (iv), seemingly, since he nowhere formulated (i)-(vi)) that "the similar areas
are not similar enough." 21 He fails to explain why
the rates of criminal homicide in Michigan and in
Illinois from 1920 to 1960 are not relevant, but
simply alleges that the states aren't "similar
enough." His criticism does, however, tacitly
concede that if the jurisdictions were "similar
enough," then it would be logically possible to
argue from the evidence against (iv) to the disconfirmation of (2a). And this seems to be in
keeping with the nature of the case. Thus it is this
second line of attack which needs closer examination.
Van den Haag's own position and objections
apart, what is likely to strike the neutral observer
who studies the ways in which (i)- (vi) have been
tested and declared disconfirmed is that their
disconfirmation, and afortiori, the disconfirmation
of (2a), is imperfect for two related reasons. First,
all the tests rely upon unproved empirical assumptions; second, it is not known whether there is any
statisticalsignificance to the results of the tests. It
is important to make these concessions, and
abolitionists and other disbelievers in the deterrent
efficacy of the death penalty have not always done
SO.
It is not possible here to review all the evidence
and reach a judgment on the empirical status of
(i)-(vi). But it is possible and desirable to illustrate how the two qualifications cited above must
be understood, and then to assess their effect on
the empirical status of (2a). The absence of
statistical significance may be illustrated by
reference to hypothesis (v). According to the
published studies, the annual rate of assaults upon
on-duty policemen in abolition jurisdictions is
lower than in death penalty jurisdictions05 But
the studies do not answer whether the difference is
statistically significant because the data were not
submitted to tests of statistical significance. Nor is
21Van den Haag, supranote 1,at 146.
25 A rate of 1.2 attacks per 100,000 population in
abolition jurisdictions as opposed to 1.3 per 100,000
population in death penalty jurisdictions.

there any known method by which the data could
be subjected to any such tests. This is, of course,
no reason to suppose that the evidence is really
not evidence after all, or that though it is evidence
against (i) it is not evidence against (2a). Statis-.
tical significance is, after all, only a measure of the
strength of evidence, not a sine qua non of evidential status.
The qualification concerning unproved assumptions is more important, and is worth examining
somewhat more fully (though, again, only illustratively). Consider hypothesis (i). Is one entitled to
infer that (i) is disconfirmed because in fact a
study of the annual homicide rates (as measured
by vital statistics showing cause of death) unquestionably indicates that the rate in all abolition
states is consistently lower than in all death penalty
states? To make this inference one must assume
that (Ai) homicides as measured by vital statistics
are in a generally constant ratio to criminal
homicides, (A2) the years for which the evidence
has been gathered are representative and not
atypical, (As) however much fluctuations in the
homicide rate owe to other factors, there is a
non-negligible proportion which is a function of
the severity of the penalty, and (A4) the deterrent
effect of a penalty is not significantly weakened by
its infrequent imposition. There are, of course,
other assumptions, but these are central and
sufficiently representative here. Assumption A, is
effectively unmeasurable because the concept of a
criminal homicide is the concept of a homicide
which deserves to be criminally prosecuted. Nevertheless, A, has been accepted by criminologists for
over a generation. A2 is confirmable, on the other
hand, and bit by bit, a year at a time, seems to be
being confirmed. Assumption As is rather more
interesting. To the degree to which it is admitted
or insisted that other factors than the severity of
the penalty affect the rate of homicide, to that
degree As becomes increasingly dubious; but at the
same time testing (2a) by (i) becomes increasingly
unimportant. The urgency of testing (2a) rests
upon the assumption that it is the deterrent
efficacy of penalties which is the chief factor in the
rate of crimes, and it is absurd to hold that assumption and at the same time doubt As. On the other
hand, A4 is almost certainly false (and has been
believed so by Bentham and other social theorists
for nearly two hundred years). The falsity of A4,
however, is not of fatal harm to the disconfirma26For a discussion surrounding this point see, H.
BEDAu, supranote 14, at 56-74.
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tion of (i) because it is not known how infrequently
a severe penalty such as death or life imprisonment may be imposed without decreasing its
deterrent efficacy. The available information on
this point leads one to doubt that for the general
population the frequency with which the death
sentence is imposed makes any significant difference to the volume of criminal homicide.
These four assumptions and the way in which
they bear upon interpretation and evaluation of the
evidence against (i), and therefore the disconfirmation of (2a), are typical of what one finds as
one examines the work of criminologists as it
relates to the rest of these corollaries of (2a). Is it
reasonable, in the light of these considerations, to
infer that there is no evidence against (i)-(vi), or
that although there may be evidence against
(i)- (vi), there is none against (2a)? Probably not.
Short of unindentified and probably unobtainable
(Ccrucial experiments," it is impossible to marshall
evidence for (2a) or for (i)-(vi) except by means
of certain additional assumptions such as A1-A 4.
To reason otherwise is to rely on nothing more
than the fact that it is logically possible to grant
the evidence against (i)-(vi) and yet deny that
(2a) is false; or it is to insist that the assumptions
which the inference relies upon are not plausible
assumptions at all (or though plausible are themselves not confirmed) and that no other assumptions can be brought forward which will both be
immune to objections and still preserve the linkage
between the evidence, (i)-(vi), and (2a). The
danger now is that one will repudiate assumptions
such as A 1-A4 so as to guarantee the failure of
efforts to disconfirm (2a) via disconfirmation of
(i)-(vi); or else that one will place the standards
of evidence too high before one accepts the disconfirmation. In either case one has begun to
engage in the familiar but discreditable practice of
"protecting the hypothesis" by making it in
effect immune to any kind of disconfirmation.
In sum, then, the abolitionist's argument regarding deterrence has the following structure:
an empirical proposition not directly testable,
(2), has a significant corollary, (2a), which in turn
suggests a number of corollaries, (i)-(vi), each of
which is testable with varying degrees of indirectSee R. DANN, Tim DETErRNT ErIECT Or CAPITAL
Puismma (1935); Savitz, A Study in Capital Punish-
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ness. Each of (i)-(vi) has been tested. To accept
the results as evidence disconfirming (i)-(vi) and
as therefore disconfirming (2a), it is necessary to
make certain assumptions, of which A 1 -A 4 are
typical. These assumptions in turn are not all
testable much less directly confirmed; some of
them, in their most plausible formulation, may
even be false (but not in that formulation necessary to the inference, however). Since this structure of indirect testing, corollary hypotheses, unproved assumptions, is typical of the circumstances
which face us when we wish to consider the evidence
for or against any complex empirical hypothesis
such as (2), I conclude that while (2) has by no
means been disproved (whatever that might mean),
it is equally clear that (2) has been disconfirmed,
rather than confirmed or left untouched, by the
inductive arguments surveyed.
An attempt has been made to review and appraise the chief "statistical" arguments, as Van den
Haag calls them, marshalled during the past
fifteen years or so in this country by those critical
of the death penalty. But in order to assess these
arguments more adequately, it is helpful to keep
in mind two other considerations. First, most of
the criminologists sceptical of (1) are led to this
attitude not by the route we have examined-the
argument against (2)-but by a general theory of
the causation of crimes of personal violence.
Given their confidence in that theory, and the
evidence for it, they tend not to credit seriously
the idea that the death penalty deters (very much),
much less the idea that it is a superior deterrent to
a severe alternative such as "life" imprisonment
(which may not deter very much, either).? The
interested reader should consult in particular
Professor Marvin Wolfgang's monograph on this
subject. Second, very little of the empirical
research purporting to establish the presence or
absence of deterrent efficacy of a given punishment
is entirely reliable, because almost no effort has
been made to isolate the relevant variables.
Surely, it is platitudinously true that some persons in some situations considering some crimes
can be deterred from committing them by some
penalties. To go beyond this, however, and supplant these variables with a series of well-confirmed functional hypotheses about the deterrent
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28See, for an excellent critique of a recent study in
deterrence, Zimring and Hawkins, supra note 13, at
111-14.

ARTs & ScrENc.Es 137, 137-41 (1956) (reprinted in H.
BEDAu, supranote 14, at 322-32).
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effect of current legal sanctions is not possible
today.'
Even if one cannot argue, as Van den Haag
does, that there is no evidence against the claim
that the death penalty is a better deterrent than
life imprisonment, this does not yet settle the
reliability of the evidence. Van den Haag could,
after all, give up his extreme initial position and
retreat to the concession that although there is
evidence against the superior deterrent efficacy of
the death penalty, still, the evidence is not very
good, indeed, not good enough to make reasonable
the policy of abolishing the death penalty. The
reply, so far as there is one, short of further
empirical studies (which undoubtedly are desirable), is twofold: the evidence against (i)-(vi) is
uniformly confirmatory; and this evidence is in
turn made intelligible by the chief current sociological theory of the causation of crimes of personal
violence. Finally, there do not seem to be any good
empirical reasons in favor of keeping the death
penalty, as a deterrent or for any other reason, a
point to be amplified in the next section.

IV
Van den Haag rests considerable weight on the
claims that "the added severity of the death
penalty adds to deterrence, or may do so;" and
that "the generalized threat of the death penalty
may be a deterrent, and the more so, the more
generally applied." These claims are open to
criticism on at least three grounds.
First, as the modal auxiliaries signal, Van den
Haag has not really committed himself to any
affirmative empirical claim, but only to a truism.
It is always logically possible, no matter what
the evidence, that a given penalty which is ex
hypothesi more severe than an alternative, may be
a better deterrent under some conditions not
often realized and be proven so by evidence not
ever detectable. For this reason, there is no possible way to prove that Van den Haag's claims
are false, no possible preponderance of evidence
against his conclusions which must, logically, force
him to give them up. One would have hoped those
who believe in the deterrent superiority of the
death penalty could, at this late date, offer their
30For a general review, see Doleschal, The Deterrent
EJec of Legal Punishment: A ReviBw of the Literature, 1
INFoRmAo REviEw oN C~mn A" DELmQ. 1, 1-17
(1969), and the many research studies cited therein,
especially the survey by Morris and Zimring, supra note
22, at 137-46.

critics something more persuasive than logical
possibilities. As it is, Van den Haag's appeal to
possible evidence comes perilously close to an
argument from ignorance: the possible evidence
one might gather is used to offset the actual
evidence that has been gathered.
Second, Van den Haag rightly regards his conclusion above as merely an instance of the general
principle that, ceteris paribus, The Greater the
Severity the Greater the Deterrence, a 'plausible"
idea, as he says. Yet the advantage on behalf of
the death penalty produced by this principle is a
function entirely of the evidence for the principle
itself. But no evidence at all is offered to make
this plausible principle into a confirmed hypothesis
of contemporary criminological theory of special
relevance to crimes of personal violence. Until
evidence concerning specific crimes, specific
penalties, and specific criminal populations is
brought forward to show that in general The
Greater the Severity the Greater the Deterrence,
the risk of being stupified by the merely plausible
is run. Besides, without any evidence for this
principle there will be a complete standoff with
the abolitionist (who, of course, can play the same
game), because he has his own equally plausible
first principle: The Greater the Severity of Punishment the Greater the Brutality Provoked Throughout Society. When at last, exhausted and frustrated by mere plausibilities, one once again turns
to study the evidence, he will find that the current
literature on deterrence in criminology does not
encourage a belief in Van den Haag's principle."
Third, Van den Haag has not given any reason
why, in the quest for deterrent efficacy, one should
fasten, as he does, on the severity of the punishments in question, rather than, as Bentham long
ago counselled, on all the relevant factors, notably
the ease, speed, and reliability with which the
punishment can be inflicted. Van den Haag cannot
hope to convince anyone who has studied the
matter that the death penalty and '"lie" imprisonment differ only in their severity and that in
all other respects affecting deterrent efficacy they
are equivalent; and if he believes this himself it
would be interesting to have seen his evidence for
it. The only thing to be said in favor of fastening
exclusively upon the question of severity in the
appraisal of punishments for their relative deterrent efficacy is this: to augment the severity of a
punishment usually imposes little if any added
31
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direct cost to operate the penal system; it even
may be cheaper. This is bound to please the harried
taxpayer, and at the same time gratify the demand
on government to "do something" about crime.
Beyond that, emphasizing the severity of punishments as the main, or indeed the sole, variable
relevant to deterrent efficacy is unbelievably
superficial.
V
Van den Haag's final point concerning where
the burden of proof lies is based, he admits, on
playing off a certainty (the death of the persons
executed) against a risk (that innocent persons,
otherwise the would-be victims of those deterrable
only by the death penalty, would be killed).n This
is not analogous, as he seems to think it is, with
the general nature of gambling, investment, and
other risk-taking enterprises. In none of them is
death deliberately inflicted, as it is, for instance,
when carrot seedlings are weeded out to enable
those remaining to grow larger (a eugenic analogy,
by the way, which might be more useful to Van
den Haag's purpose). In none, is it necessary to
sacrifice a present loss in the hope of securing a
future net gain; there is only the risk of a loss in
that hope. Moreover, in gambling ventures one
recoups what he risked if he wins, whereas in
executions society must lose something (the lives
of persons executed) no matter if it loses or wins
(the lives of innocents protected). Van den Haag's
attempt to locate the burden of proof by appeal
to principles of gambling is a failure.
Far more significantly, Van den Haag frames
the issue in such a way that the abolitionist has
no chance of discharging the burden of proof once
he accepts it. For what evidence could be marshalled to prove what Van den Haag wants proved,
that "the greater severity inherent in irrevocability [of the death penalty] ... adds nothing
to deterrence"? The evidence alluded to at the
end of section IV does tend to show that this
generalization (the negation of Van den Haag's
own principle) is indeed true, but it does not prove
its unqualified validity. It must be concluded therefore, that either Van den Haag is wrong in his
argument which shows the locus of burden of
proof to lie on the abolitionist, or one must accept
2The same objection has been previously raised in
Feinberg, Review of the Death P enlty in America, 76
ETHics 63 (1965).
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less than proof in order to discharge this burden
(in which case, the very argument Van den Haag
advances shows that the burden of proof now lies
on those who would retain the death penalty).
"Burden of proof" in areas outside judicial
precincts, where evidentiary questions are at stake,
tends to be a rhetorical phrase and nothing more.
Anyone interested in the truth of a matter will not
defer gathering evidence pending a determination
of where the burden of proof lies. For those who
do think there is a question of burden of proof, as
Van den Haag does, they should consider this:
Advocacy of the death penalty is advocacy of a
rule of penal law which empowers the state to
deliberately take human life and in general to
threaten the public with the taking of life. Ceteris
paribus, one would think anyone favoring such a
rule would be ready to offer considerable evidence
for its necessity and efficacy. Surely, some showing
of necessity, some evidentiary proof, is to be expected to satisfy the sceptical. Exactly when and in
what circumstances have the apologists for capital
punishment offered evidence to support their contentions? Where is that evidence recorded for us
to inspect, comparable to the evidence cited in
section III against the superior deterrent efficacy
of the death penalty? Van den Haag conspicuously
cited no such evidence, and so it is with all other
proponents of the death penalty. The insistance
that the burden of proof lies on abolitionists,
therefore, is nothing but the rhetorical demand of
every defender of the status quo who insists upon
evidence from those who would effect change, while
reserving throughout the right to dictate criteria
and standards of proof and refusing to offer evidence for his own view.
The death penalty is a sufficiently momentous
matter and of sufficient controversy that the
admittedly imperfect evidence assembled over the
past generation by those friendly to abolition
should by now be countered by evidence tending to
support the opposite, retentionist, position. It
remains a somewhat sad curiosity that nothing of
the sort has happened; no one has ever published
research tending to show, however inconclusively,
that the death penalty after all is a deterrent and
a superior deterrent to 'life" imprisonment. Among
scholars at least, if not among legislators and other
politicians, the perennial appeal to burden of proof
really ought to give way to offering of proof by
those interested enough to argue the issue.

